Those years turned us into better comrades, into better fighters for progress -but they did not let us be amiable people…. We become deeply distrustful in our daily lives, while at the same time putting all our confidence in the great path of humanity, in the future, in youth, in the victory of the good and the beautiful. 12 More parochially, 'political imaginary' can denote the sense of historical mission and purpose that the SED communicated to its members, both young and old, to GDR citizens more broadly, and to external supporters and opponents. What part did continuing silence, censorship and self-censorship in relation to the Stalinist purges have in the cultural reproduction of this East German narrative of past and present achievements? And how important an influence was the GDR's intense rivalry with the 'capitalist-imperialist' FRG, including growing tensions over rearmament and the status of Berlin in the late 1950s? 13 In order to answer these questions, the essay will make some reference to the many victims of Soviet military justice, East German political trials and other manifestations of Stalinist terror in Germany in the years 1945-55, whose post-1956 claims for rehabilitation were by and large ignored by the SED and whose convictions were often only quashed, if at all, by
German or Russian courts in the 1990s. 14 However, the main focus will be on German purge victims of the 1930s who were released from the Soviet camp system after 1954, usually after being formally acquitted by Soviet district or central courts; repatriated to their homeland, on the understanding that their homeland was the GDR; and in most cases readmitted to the party, in or around the year 1956. Czechoslovakia although evidence suggests that they planned such a trial and merely called it off at the last minute. 16 Yet even without a show trial, there had been several rounds of expulsions from the ruling party from 1948 onwards; secret trials held without public knowledge; and numerous convictions of party members and ordinary citizens, as well as exNazis and 'capitalists', for political or quasi-political offences. 17 In total 13,127 persons were still serving sentences in East German jails for 'crimes against the state' in the first quarter of 1956, accounting for 31.2 per cent of the prison population. 18 Only in the wake of Khrushchev's 'secret speech' in February 1956 to the 20th party congress of the Soviet Communist Party (CPSU) did these numbers begin to fall. Germany, making up 33.9 per cent of all those in jail, a higher proportion than at the beginning of the year. 22 Against this background, the fate of surviving German purge victims in the Soviet Union remained a highly sensitive, albeit largely hidden issue, with the potential to do serious damage both to the GDR's international standing and its relationship with the Soviet Union.
Political Context
In contrast to the releases from East German prisons, which at least received periodic mention in the press, it was not a subject for public discussion. But equally it could not be ignored in the hope that it would simply go away. Between 1948 and the mid-1950s the SED's leaders had defended the 1930s purges in absolute terms, while acting on the assumption that there were no 'innocent' victims. 23 A similar attitude was prevalent in the SED's sister parties, the West German Communist Party (KPD), which was active until a ban imposed by the federal constitutional court in 1956, and the SEW, the Socialist Unity Party of West Berlin. 24 For instance, all three parties vigorously denounced as 'anti-Soviet propaganda' the claims made by Margarete Buber-Neumann, widow of the murdered KPD functionary Heinz Neumann, in her 1949 report Als Gefangene bei Stalin und Hitler.
Published in the west but banned in the east, this book provided a distressing account of her husband's arrest and execution, and of her own experiences of betrayal and imprisonment in the Soviet Union, followed by delivery into the clutches of the Gestapo and incarceration at Ravensbrück, the Nazis' main concentration camp for women prisoners, in 1940-45.
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The negative stance taken by the three German communist parties was supported by the Soviet authorities who usually refused exit visas to convicted foreign prisoners, even if they had served their sentences, and in many cases condemned former Gulag inmates to further terms of imprisonment or banishment in the late 1940s and early 1950s. 26 The Kremlin was also at one with the GDR in believing that returnees could either disrupt East German society 
Repatriations 1955-1962
The first official recognition in the SED party records that current and future applications for In anticipation of the destitute state of some of the returnees, it was also recommended that they each be offered a 'transition allowance' (Überbrückungsgeld) of up to 2,000 marks from state funds, depending on their individual and family circumstances. In order to prevent them all from concentrating in Berlin, which had limited municipal resources to help the sick and old among them, and in view of the danger that some might be tempted, if in Berlin, to consider moving west or to try making contact with western relatives, it was recommended that those without firm ties to the German capital be dispersed across all 14 provincial For.... those whose material circumstances are not good, the GDR's embassy in Moscow will cover the costs of acquiring a Soviet exit visa and the entire costs of the journey from current place of residence to Berlin. 36 To speed up the process at the Soviet end, the Central Committee's cadre department also recommended the immediate despatch of a party official to Moscow whose job would be to resolve practical and other difficulties.
[ What kind of welcome did they get, beyond an interview with officials from the ZPKK followed by formal confirmation of restoration of party membership?
Ulbricht, rehabilitations and the limits of de-Stalinisation
Although it pardoned or granted early release to several thousand of its own political and criminal prisoners in 1956 (and again in 1960), the East German regime did not have the same judicial powers to alter verdicts or sentences passed by organs of the Soviet state.
Rehabilitation of returning German communist victims of the 1930s purges was therefore a separate, quasi-judicial process with its own political logic and rationale as determined by the ruling SED and its central apparatus. 42 The purpose, at least as far as the ZPKK and the majority of Politburo members were concerned, was to make restored party membership and the privileges that went with it the basis for renewed discipline and control, not to correct past by the end of 1961. This was in spite of the fact that Ulbricht's internal authority was immeasurably strengthened by the building of the Berlin Wall in August of that year. 48 In the meantime, after 1962 repatriations from the Soviet Union were officially considered to have been completed, and a line was drawn under the internal process of rehabilitation. What the article failed to mention, however, was that Globig had spent almost 20 years as a clear to her -and she accepted -that she could not discuss her experiences in the Soviet Union in public. 54 The SED needed heroes, not victims. Ordinary party members and the general public were left entirely in the dark about the rehabilitation process, while even the rehabilitees were only informed verbally about the decision to readmit them. They were provided with no formal documentation, and indeed were required to hand over any Soviet documents in their possession -especially those pertaining to their arrest, imprisonment, release and judicial rehabilitation -to the party officials who came to meet them at Berlin's
Ostbahnhof. 55 The majority of East Germans were also kept in the dark about developments in the Soviet This remark has the added poignancy that it was uttered in the presence of the former Gulag prisoner Werner Eberlein, who by the late 1950s had become Ulbricht's chief interpreter on official visits to the USSR and was therefore obliged to translate it into Russian for Khrushchev's benefit. 58 The threat posed by Solzhenitsyn's book could be dealt with quite simply by banning it in the GDR, a move formally announced by Ulbricht in his closing address to a meeting between top party and state officials and East German writers and artists in March 1963. 59 In the early 1960s the SED's propaganda machine also cynically exploited the international publicity given to the trial of the Holocaust's chief architect Adolf Eichmann in Jerusalemand to trials of SS and other war criminals in the FRG -to focus attention on (West) Germany's Nazi past rather than the GDR's Stalinist past and present. 60 When, in the immediate aftermath of the building of the Berlin Wall in August 1961, the West German novelist Günter Grass described Ulbricht as a 'concentration camp commandant' in an open letter to the President of the East German Writers' Association, Anna Seghers, this too was dismissed as an imperialist distortion. 61 As long as none of its own cultural luminaries sought 132 to raise difficult questions about the subject of Stalinism, in other words, provided they remained focused on the achievements of socialism, the reactionary, bestial nature of Nazism and the existence of former Nazis in the West German establishment, the East German regime felt reasonably safe.
In 1964-65, however, the senior SED officials in charge of cultural policy, notably the Politburo's ideology chief, Kurt Hager, and Ulbricht's successor-in-waiting, Erich Honecker . 71 Most were simply ignored, however, and had no outlets for describing their inner feelings. In an essay published in the 1990s, the East German Peter
Erler convincingly showed how women returnees, especially those who were single, widowed or beyond working age, 'suffered in particular as a result of the party-imposed silence and the need to deny a part of their own identities'. 72 Expressions of private grief and sorrow indeed had no place in the classic narrative conventions of communist life writing. 73 What of the longer-term impact of the rehabilitation process on the SED as a ruling party?
Given that many of the German victims of the 1930s purges had been old Spartacists like 80 Above all the GDR was cast by its leaders in the late 1950s and 1960s as the 'better Germany' (in contrast to the 'militaristic' FRG), and as a society built by unsullied heroes (in contrast to the 'decadent' west). In their life stories written for the SED archive, rehabilitated party veterans could celebrate their opposition to Social Democrats under the Weimar Republic, their contribution to the war against fascism in Spain in the late 1930s, their fearless resistance to Nazism during Soviet exile, and their triumphant return to the GDR; but they also knew better than to make any connection between German communism and Stalinist terror or to question the SED's beneficence in quietly readmitting them into its ranks. If they accepted censorship at home as a necessary means of battling against internal class enemies and protecting the GDR's all-important relationship with the Soviet Union, 81 publication of critical texts abroad -especially in West Germany -was a step which very few 137 returning victims would take, out of fear of being labelled disloyal. Besides which, should these informal mechanisms of control ever fail, they were backed up by a harsh penal code which made unsanctioned contacts with western publishing houses or human rights groups equivalent to the crime of 'landesverräterische Nachrichtenübermittlung' (treasonous disclosure of state secrets), carrying with it a possible prison sentence of two to 12 years. 82 Only in the years 1988-90 was the silence that had pervaded this issue for so long gradually and half-heartedly lifted. In stops and starts, and beginning with a hedged statement by the party in June 1988 ahead of the 70th anniversary of the founding of the KPD, 83 the East with greater force and consistency, from Hermann Weber's research centre on the history of the GDR based at the University of Mannheim. 84 But the main driver of change -as in the years 1953-56 -was the Soviet Union itself, a fact which was all too quickly forgotten in the anti-communist euphoria that followed German reunification in the early 1990s. 
